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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In this bankruptcy matter, we must decide whether 
certain terms in a class action settlement agreement constitute 
an executory contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).  The Internal 
Revenue Service contended the settlement agreement was not an 
executory contract.  Both the bankruptcy court and the district 
  




 The facts are undisputed.  Columbia Gas System, 
Incorporated, its subsidiary, Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corporation (TCO), and their affiliates comprise a natural gas 
system which explores, produces, purchases, stores, transmits, 
and distributes natural gas.  TCO is Columbia Gas System's 
principal gas purchaser from producers in the Southwest, 
Midcontinent, and Appalachia and operates extensive underground 
storage facilities. 
 On July 26, 1985, Enterprise Energy Corporation and two 
other companies filed a class action against TCO in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.  The 
district court certified as a class2 the producers of natural gas 
in the Appalachian region who were parties to gas purchase 
contracts with TCO.  The class comprised 2163 member producers 
                     
1
.  The district court's opinion is published as Enterprise 
Energy Corp. v. United States ex rel. IRS (In re Columbia Gas 
System, Inc.), 146 B.R. 106 (D. Del. 1992). 
2
.  The class consists of "[a]ll owners, operators and producers 
of natural gas producing wells in the Appalachian region (New 
York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland, Virginia 
and Ohio) who are parties to gas purchase contracts with Columbia 
Gas Transmission Corporation entitling them to receive the 
maximum lawful price or a deregulated price under the NGPA . . . 
and against whom Columbia has invoked a price reduction for 
amounts due under the contracts."  Enterprise Energy Corp. v. 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240, 243 (S.D. Ohio 
1991). 
  
who held 852 gas purchase contracts.  TCO had invoked a price 
reduction under a cost recovery clause which formed the basis of 
their complaint.   
 The gas purchase contracts set the price for each unit 
of natural gas delivered to TCO at the maximum price permitted 
under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 during the month of 
delivery.  The class members alleged that TCO breached their gas 
purchase contracts by paying less than the maximum price after it 
invoked the cost recovery clause. 
 For five years there was extensive discovery.  As trial 
loomed, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Proposed Class 
Action Settlement ("settlement agreement"), which the district 
court approved on June 18, 1991.  Enterprise Energy Corp. v. 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. Ohio 1991).  
Incidental to its approval under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(e), id. at 248, the court issued an order stating in part: 
 
  f.  Named plaintiffs, Class Members and 
defendant [TCO] shall now consummate and be 
bound by the Settlement. 
 
  g.  Except for claims arising under the 
Settlement on behalf of Class Members or 
Columbia, and at such time as this Order of 
the Court approving the Settlement as final 
is non-appealable, named plaintiffs and all 
Class Members . . . shall be deemed to 
release and forever discharge the defendant 
. . . from any and all claims of the type 
asserted in this litigation relating to 
defendant's exercise of the cost recovery 
clause contained in the Class Members' gas 
purchase contracts at any time during the 
period commencing on or about July 10, 1985 
and ending on or about July 10, 1991. 
 
  
  h.  Jurisdiction is hereby retained as 
to matters related to the interpretation, 
administration and consummation of the 
Settlement as approved in this Order. 
 
Id. at 252.  The order became final and unappealable on July 18, 
1991.  
 The settlement agreement required TCO to deposit $30 
million into an escrow account "in settlement of, and as a full 
and complete discharge and release of TCO, for all of [the class 
members'] claims arising on or before January 1991."  Enterprise 
Energy Corp. v. United States ex rel. IRS (In re Columbia Gas 
System, Inc.), 146 B.R. 106, 109 (D. Del. 1992).  TCO was to pay 
$15 million into escrow by March 21, 1991, and the other $15 
million by March 23, 1992.  This schedule was apparently set for 
TCO's convenience; TCO's duty to make the second payment was not 
contingent on the class members' performance of any of their 
obligations.  TCO paid the first $15 million on time but then 
filed for bankruptcy. 
 Under the settlement agreement, class members were 
entitled to receive their share of the escrow monies only after 
they executed a release of claims and a supplemental contract.  
The settlement agreement stated "payments to individual Class 
Members out of the escrowed amounts will be contingent upon 
receipt by [TCO] of a duly executed release of all such Claims 
and a duly executed contract supplement . . . ."  J. App. at 57-
58.  While each class member had to execute a release to get 
payment from the escrow fund, the claims each held against TCO 
were to be extinguished (and they in fact were, see supra, 
  
district court order ¶ g) by the court order accepting the 
settlement agreement. 
    The supplemental contracts were designed to implement 
amendments and clarifications of pricing and other terms 
concerning future gas deliveries to TCO.  The settlement 
agreement established the terms of these contracts, including 
increasing the price TCO would pay to the class members.  Because 
many class members relied on TCO as the principal purchaser of 
their gas, the supplemental contracts were important to them, a 
point made in the following exchange at oral argument before the 
district court: 
 
 The Court: So that . . . supplying the 
supplemental agreements, contracts, was not 
just an option that [the class members] had.  
It was necessary for their continued 
operation? 
 
 [Counsel for the Class]: Exactly, your honor.  
Exactly. 
Id. at 276.  
 By July 31, 1991, the class members involved in forty-
one of the purchase contracts had completed the execution of the 
release and supplemental contracts and were entitled to their 
share of the escrow monies.  But on that day, thirteen days after 
the settlement agreement had become final, TCO filed a voluntary 
Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy in Delaware.  On February 20, 
1992, the class members filed a motion to compel TCO to assume or 
reject the settlement agreement under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
  
U.S.C. § 365.3  TCO and the class members had agreed that TCO 
would assume the settlement agreement and jointly filed a 
proposed order. 
  After notice of the proposed order was sent to the 
proper parties, the United States filed an objection on behalf of 
the Internal Revenue Service, one of TCO's creditors.4  Finding 
the settlement agreement was not executory within the meaning of 
11 U.S.C. § 365, the bankruptcy court upheld the objection and 
denied the class members' motion.5   
 The class members appealed to the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware.  The district court 
held that the settlement agreement was a contract, but affirmed 
the bankruptcy court on the grounds the contract was not 
executory for purposes of § 365.  In re Columbia Gas, 146 B.R. at 
113-14.  Therefore TCO did not have the option of assuming or 
                     
3
.  Section 365 provides in part: 
 
 § 365.  Executory contracts and unexpired 
leases 
 
  (a)  Except as provided in sections 756 and 766 of 
this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this 
section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, 
may assume or reject any executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor. 
4
.  The record suggests that the IRS's claim is substantial, 
apparently in the range of $500 million over the next five years.  
J. App. at 287. 
5
.  The bankruptcy court also apparently held the settlement 
agreement was not a contract, as it cited cases holding that 
judicial orders cannot be considered executory contracts. 
  
rejecting the settlement agreement.  Id. at 114.  This appeal 
followed. 
 II.  
 We "exercise plenary review of the legal standard 
applied by the district and bankruptcy courts, but review the 
latter court's findings of fact on a clearly erroneous standard."  
In re Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(citations omitted).  "Because in bankruptcy cases the district 
court sits as an appellate court, our review of the district 
court's decision is plenary."  Brown v. Pennsylvania State 
Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988); see also 
Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101 
(3d Cir. 1981). 
 Jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court was proper under 
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).  The district court had jurisdiction 
over the appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court, id. 
§ 158(a), and we have jurisdiction over the appeal of the 
district court's judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 III. 
 In this appeal, we must decide whether the settlement 
agreement was a contract, and if so, whether it was executory so 
that TCO could elect to assume or reject it under § 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.   
 The IRS argues the settlement agreement is not a 
contract but a judgment of the court.6  It maintains "[s]ince the 
                     
6
.  The class members contend the IRS did not properly preserve 
this point for appeal because it did not cross-appeal from the 
  
Settlement Agreement was merged into the court's judgment, it 
cannot be an executory contract within the meaning of Bankruptcy 
Code Section 365."  Appellee's Br. at 32.  The bankruptcy court 
apparently agreed, observing "there is authority to the effect 
that the phrase 'executory contract' should not normally be 
applied to a judicial order."  J. App. at 178.  While the 
bankruptcy court did not explicitly hold the agreement was a 
judgment, the cases it cited7 hold that where contracts have been 
reduced to judgment there is no "contract" remaining for purposes 
of § 365.  The district court, however, distinguished those 
cases, holding "[f]or bankruptcy purposes . . . it is appropriate 
to treat the judicially approved settlement agreement in this 
case as a contract."  In re Columbia Gas, 146 B.R. at 113. 
 At the outset, we should ask whether this settlement 
agreement would be considered a contract had there been no 
bankruptcy.  Generally, application of the Bankruptcy Code does 
not change the attributes of a given legal relationship.  Butner 
(..continued) 
district court's judgment which held the settlement agreement is 
a contract.  We disagree because "it is . . . settled that the 
appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a 
decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument 
may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an 
insistence upon a matter overlooked or ignored by it."  Dalle 
Tezze v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 
United States Dep't of Labor, 814 F.2d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(quoting United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 
435 (1924)). 
7
.  Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Roxse Homes Ltd. Partnership, 83 B.R. 
185 (D. Mass.), aff'd without op., 860 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1988); 
In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 
(1978). 
  
v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).  Thus, if the settlement 
agreement should be considered a contract under relevant 
nonbankruptcy law, it will be a contract in bankruptcy "[u]nless 
some federal interest requires a different result . . . ."  Id. 
at 55.   
 Although settlement agreements may be judicially 
approved, they share many characteristics of voluntary contracts 
and are construed according to traditional precepts of contract 
construction.  cf. Fox v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban 
Dev., 680 F.2d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 1982) (observing this point for 
consent decrees).  In a nonbankruptcy context, we have treated a 
settlement agreement as a contract.  See Halderman v. Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311, 318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 850 (1990).   
 We see nothing special in this bankruptcy that counsels 
a different approach.  The core of this settlement agreement was 
consensual obligations.  The parties crafted the agreement and 
the court approved it.  There is no judgment on the merits, a 
factor that distinguishes cases cited by the bankruptcy court.  
Furthermore, the rights and obligations of the parties do not 
derive solely from the court's judgment, but depend at least in 
part on the performance of the other party.  What is especially 
significant in this case is that there remains an agreement that 
the debtor can breach which could give rise to a claim against 
it.  Although we recognize that not all settlement agreements 
should be considered contracts, we believe the factors already 
enumerated are sufficient to consider this settlement agreement 
  
as a contract for purposes of § 365.  In this respect, we agree 
with the district court. 
 IV. 
 The heart of this dispute is whether the settlement 
agreement was executory on July 31, 1991, when TCO filed its 
bankruptcy petition.  The term "executory contract" is not 
defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and the phrase does not indicate 
its intended scope. 
 The legislative history of § 365 suggests a broad 
reading of "executory."  Congressional reports stated "[t]hough 
there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, 
it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due 
to some extent on both sides."  H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303; 
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844.   
 Most courts have agreed that the definition suggested 
by the legislative history would cut too broadly, "since it is 
the rare agreement that does not involve unperformed obligations 
on either side."  Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm 
Partnership), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989).  As one 
commentator observed, "[a]ll contracts to a greater or less 
extent are executory.  When they cease to be so, they cease to be 
contracts."  Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
Part I, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 450 (1973) (citation omitted). 
 The language and legislative history of § 365 having 
proved unavailing, courts and commentators sought to analyze the 
  
purpose of § 365 in order to formulate a definition of "executory 
contract."  Executory contracts in bankruptcy are best recognized 
as a combination of assets and liabilities to the bankruptcy 
estate; the performance the nonbankrupt owes the debtor 
constitutes an asset, and the performance the debtor owes the 
nonbankrupt is a liability.  See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and 
Limits of Bankruptcy Law 106-07 (1986).  The debtor (or trustee 
that has stepped into the debtor's shoes) may elect to assume an 
executory contract, in which case § 365 mandates that the debtor 
accept the liability with the asset and fully perform his end of 
the bargain.  11 U.S.C. § 365(b).   
 The debtor will assume an executory contract when the 
package of assets and liabilities is a net asset to the estate.  
When it is not the debtor will (or ought to) reject the contract.  
11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  Because assumption acts as a renewed 
acceptance of the terms of the executory bargain, the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that the cost of performing the debtor's 
obligations is an administrative expense of the estate, which 
will be paid first out of the assets of the estate.8  11 U.S.C. § 
                     
8
.  In In re Taylor, 913 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1990), we 
stated: 
 
 [T]he "assume or reject" dichotomy means 
simply that if the trustee wishes to obtain 
for the estate the future benefits of the 
executory portion of the contract, the 
trustee must also assume the burdens of that 
contract, as an expense of bankruptcy 
administration (i.e., having priority over 
all pre-bankruptcy claims of creditors). 
 
  
507(a)(1) (1988); University Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re 
University Medical Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 In cases where the nonbankrupt party has fully 
performed, it makes no sense to talk about assumption or 
rejection.   At that point only a liability exists for the 
debtor--a simple claim held by the nonbankrupt against the 
estate, Jackson, supra, at 106--and "[t]he estate has whatever 
benefit it can obtain from the other party's performance and the 
trustee's rejection would neither add to nor detract from the 
creditor's claim or the estate's liability."  Countryman, supra, 
at 451.  Rejection is meaningless in this context, and assumption 
would be of no benefit to the estate, serving only to convert the 
nonbankrupt's claim into a first priority expense of the estate 
at the expense of the other creditors.9  Id. at 452. 
(..continued) 
Through the mechanism of assumption, § 365 allows the debtor to 
continue doing business with others who might otherwise be 
reluctant to do so because of the bankruptcy filing.  Richmond 
Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
 
 Rejection, which is appropriate when a contract is a 
liability to the bankrupt, is equivalent to a nonbankruptcy 
breach.  11 U.S.C. § 365(g).  Rejection leaves the nonbankrupt 
with a claim against the estate just as would a breach in the 
nonbankruptcy context, and unless the nonbankrupt's claim is 
somehow secured, he will be a general unsecured creditor of the 
estate.  Accordingly, if the debtor is insolvent, the 
nonbankrupt's claim for breach will not be paid in full.  An 
appropriate rejection in bankruptcy will thus benefit the 
creditors as a whole at the expense of the nonbankrupt.  See 
Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 108 
(1986).   
9
.  In this circumstance, elevating the nonbankrupt's claim to 
administrative expense priority by "assuming" it would offend 
"the general policy of the bankruptcy laws [which] is equality of 
distribution among all creditors . . . ."  H.R. Rep. No. 595, 
  
 Likewise, if the debtor has fully performed, the 
performance owed by the nonbankrupt is an asset of the bankruptcy 
estate and should be analyzed as such, not as an executory 
contract.  Jackson, supra, at 107.  Rejection of the contract at 
this point is no different from abandonment of property of the 
estate, an action taken only when the property is "burdensome to 
the estate or . . . is of inconsequential value and benefit to 
the estate."  11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).   
 These considerations led us to adopt, as have many 
courts of appeals, the following definition of executory contract 
for purposes of § 365: "[An executory contract is] a contract 
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other 
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of 
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach 
excusing performance of the other."  Sharon Steel Corp. v. 
National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(citing cases). 
  Thus, unless both parties have unperformed obligations 
that would constitute a material breach if not performed, the 
contract is not executory under § 365.  When it is the 
nonbankrupt party who has substantially performed so that its 
failure to complete performance would not constitute a material 
breach excusing performance of the debtor,10 the nonbankrupt 
(..continued) 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6147. 
10
.  In order to determine whether failure to perform the 
remaining obligations would constitute a material breach, we need 
to consider contract principles under the relevant nonbankruptcy 
  
party is "relegated to the position of a general creditor of the 
bankrupt estate."  Marcus & Millichap Inc. v. Munple, Ltd. (In re 
(..continued) 
law.  In Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise College Park, Inc.), 703 
F.2d 1339, 1348 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983), the court noted "a 
bankruptcy court should determine whether one of the parties' 
failure to perform its remaining obligations would give rise to a 
'material breach' excusing performance by [the] other party under 
the contract law applicable to the contract . . . ."  See also 
Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 
1989) (citing In re Cochise); Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets 
& Beard Farm Partnership), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(looking to relevant state law).   
 
 In this case, the settlement agreement was created by 
the parties in a federal court in Ohio, and Ohio law would 
therefore normally apply.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 
487, 496 (1941).  However, the parties do not indicate any 
particular law as governing either the issue of material breach 
or the construction of the settlement agreement.  Where, as here, 
"the parties do not make an issue of choice of law, we have no 
obligation to make an independent determination of what rule 
would apply if they had made an issue of the matter."  In re 
Stoecker, 5 F.3d 1022, 1029 (7th Cir. 1993).  Accordingly, like 
the parties and the district court, we will construe the issue of 
what would constitute a material breach under general contract 
principles.  See Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 
1069, 1076 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (allowing consensus of parties and 
lower courts as to choice of law to control when no reason to 
unsettle that agreement is present).   
 
 Finally, we believe application of Ohio law would 
result in a similar analysis of the general contract principles 
upon which we rely.  See Rhodes v. Rhodes Indus., Inc., 595 
N.E.2d 441, 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (adopting Restatement of 
Contracts (Second) approach to materiality of breach); see also 
Kichler's, Inc. v. Persinger, 265 N.E.2d 319, 321 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1970); Blenheim Homes, Inc. v. Mathews, 196 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1963); Boehl v. Maidens, 139 N.E.2d 645, 649 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1956).  Thus, there is no need for us to examine further the 
issue of which substantive law to apply, as the result does not 
depend on our choice.  Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 
F.2d 603, 606 (6th Cir. 1965); cf. Benevides v. Alexander (In re 
Alexander), 670 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding no need to 
look at state law for whether contract is an executory contract, 
but even if examined under state law there would be no change in 
the outcome). 
  
Munple, Ltd.), 868 F.2d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 1989).  The time for 
testing whether there are material unperformed obligations on 
both sides is when the bankruptcy petition is filed.  Collingwood 
Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 
F.2d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding contracts executory at 
time of petition can be assumed); Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. 
(In re Newcomb), 744 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating 
critical time to be when the petition was filed). 
 As we have noted, at stake is the relative priority11 
of the claims of the IRS and the class members to TCO's assets in 
bankruptcy.  If the contract is executory, TCO would assume it, 
and the $15 million TCO still owes would become an administrative 
expense of the estate.  As an administrative expense, the class 
members' claims would fall into the category afforded highest 
payment priority.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1); University Medical 
Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1078.  If the contract is not executory, the 
class members would have a general unsecured claim and would have 
lowest payment priority, and would be paid after the IRS's claim, 
which is seventh in priority regardless of the outcome of this 
dispute.  11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988).12   
                     
11
.  The priority of the claims determines whether and how much 
of the claims are paid, regardless of whether the debtor 
liquidates or reorganizes.  See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1988) 
(specifying liquidation scheme with first priority claims paid 
before seventh priority claims, which are paid before unsecured 
claims); id. § 1129(a)(8), (9) (requiring administrative expenses 
to be paid in full in cash on effective date of a 
reorganization). 
12
.  We note the IRS's claim would have eighth priority in cases 
commenced after October 22, 1994.  See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
  
 A. 
 The contract was clearly executory on TCO's side when 
it filed for bankruptcy, a point both parties appear to accept.  
It had not paid the second $15 million into escrow, nor had it 
completed the administrative work necessary to authorize 
distribution of the escrow monies to those class members who had 
signed and executed releases and supplemental contracts.  While 
the administrative details TCO still had to perform are arguably 
non-material (an issue we need not reach), the $15 million 
payment is unquestionably a material obligation,13 and TCO's 
failure to make the second payment certainly would constitute a 
material breach. 
 B. 
 The materiality of the class members' unperformed  
obligations is a closer question.  As we have noted, the 
obligations on both sides must be so far unperformed so that 
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a 
material breach excusing performance of the other.  The class 
members had unperformed duties under the settlement agreement.   
Only 41 of the 852 contracts had been processed when TCO filed 
for bankruptcy, and the class members responsible for the 
remaining 811 contracts still had to execute releases and 
(..continued) 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, §§ 304(c), 702, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 
(1994). 
13
.  While the district court suggests TCO's completed 
performance was substantial, it stops short of stating TCO's 
remaining obligations were not material.  In re Columbia Gas, 146 
B.R. at 114. 
  
supplemental contracts in order to receive their shares of the 
escrow fund.  It must be the contention of the class members that 
these obligations are sufficiently material that failure to 
perform would constitute a material breach of the agreement by 
the class members.14 
 In order to determine the materiality of the class 
members' obligations, we turn first to basic contract principles.  
There is a distinction in the law between failure of a 
condition15 and a breach of a duty: "Non-occurrence of a 
condition is not a breach by a party unless he is under a duty 
that the condition occur."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
225(3) (1981).16  This distinction between a condition and a duty 
                     
14
.  The class members also argue the settlement agreement 
represents an accord, which, if not satisfied, would allow the 
members to revive their original claims against TCO.  They cite 
In re Miller, 54 B.R. 710, 712 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985), which 
distinguishes novation, an agreement to extinguish one duty and 
replace it with another, from an accord, by which a party agrees 
to accept a substitute performance for a pre-existing duty, 
although the original duty is not extinguished until the accord 
is performed.  While the court stated that novation is never 
presumed in an ambiguous situation, id. at 713, we believe this 
situation is not ambiguous.  Unlike the parties in In re Miller, 
who had specifically allowed for reinstatement of the original 
claim upon failure of the settlement, id., the parties here have 
an explicit court order which extinguishes the old claims and 
replaces them with the Settlement Agreement.  See supra part I 
for the text of the district court's order.  As the district 
court noted, "[T]he order approving the settlement agreement 
suggests that there could only be an action for breach of 
contract."  In re Columbia Gas, 146 B.R. at 113 n.3.  We agree. 
15
.  The Restatement has dropped the term "condition precedent" 
in favor of simply stating it as "condition."  E. Allen 
Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.2, at 349 (1990).  We 
will follow that convention here. 
16
.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225 cmt. d, which 
provides: 
  
(or promise) is important here.  The Restatement makes clear that 
while "a contracting party's failure to fulfill a condition 
excuses performance by the other party whose performance is so 
conditioned, it is not, without an independent promise to perform 
the condition, a breach of contract subjecting the nonfulfilling 
party to liability for damages."  Merritt Hill Vineyards, Inc. v. 
Windy Heights Vineyard, Inc., 460 N.E.2d 1077, 1081-82 (N.Y. 
1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 225).  In this 
case, if the remaining obligations in the contract are mere 
conditions, not duties, then the contract cannot be executory for 
purposes of § 365 because no material breach could occur. 
 The determination whether a contract term is a promise 
or condition is a problem of interpretation, so that "each case 
turns on its own facts . . . ."  E. Allen Farnsworth, 2 
Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.4, at 366 (1990).  We are mindful 
that: 
 
 Interpreting a settlement agreement presents 
a question of contract law, in which [t]he 
primary object . . . is to give effect to the 
intention of the parties.  Absent clear 
language in the settlement agreement to 
resolve a dispute over the proper 
construction of a contract, a court may go 
outside the four corners of the contract and 
consider extrinsic and parol evidence 
(..continued) 
 
 [A] term making an event a condition of an 
obligor's duty does not of itself impose a 
duty on the obligee and the non-occurrence of 
the event is not of itself a breach by the 
obligee.  Unless the obligee is under such a 
duty, the non-occurrence of the event gives 
rise to no claim against him. 
  
presented by the parties.  This requires the 
district court to then conduct fact-finding 
so that it may resolve the ambiguities 
inherent in the contract. . . . [But i]f the 
court finds that a contract is ambiguous and 
that extrinsic evidence is undisputed, then 
the interpretation of the contract remains a 
question of law for the court to decide. 
Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 455-56 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991) (citations omitted). 
 1. 
 With these principles in mind, we turn first to an 
analysis of the releases and then to the contract supplements.  
If a class member declined to execute a release, the settlement 
agreement provides that TCO retains that class member's portion 
of the $30 million.  But the class member's cause of action 
against TCO on the gas purchase contract would not be revived.  
All such claims were extinguished when the district court's order 
became final on July 18, 1991.17  
                     
17
.  The settlement agreement here is much like the insurance 
contract in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Texscan Corp. (In 
re Texscan Corp.), 976 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1992), where the 
court held that because of a statute, the bankrupt's failure to 
pay insurance premiums could not relieve the nonbankrupt insurer 
from its obligation to provide insurance coverage.  Even if the 
failure to pay premiums might be a material breach absent the 
statute, the court held, the statute meant the insurer's 
performance was not excused and therefore the definition of 
"executory" in the Bankruptcy Code was not met.  Id.  Here, even 
if the failure to execute the releases and supplemental contracts 
were a breach of part of the settlement agreement (which we hold 
it is not), the operation of the court order would prevent that 
breach from operating to excuse performance by either the class 
members or TCO.  Thus, on this basis as well, the remaining 
obligations do not suffice to make the contract executory. 
  
 The language of the settlement agreement makes clear 
the parties intended to make execution of the releases a 
condition of payment rather than a duty: "[P]ayments to 
individual Class Members out of the escrowed amounts will be 
contingent upon receipt by [TCO] of a duly executed release 
. . . .  If the amount allocated to a particular contract by 
Class Counsel . . . is not finally distributed to that particular 
contract, then such Distributable Amount . . . shall be returned 
to [TCO] . . . ."  J. App. at 57-58, 64-65.18  The parties 
specified that the class members' claims would be extinguished 
(as they in fact were) by the court order accepting the 
settlement agreement.  Thus, the releases served no more than the 
administrative purpose of a condition to the class members' 
ability to get payment from the escrow fund. 
 The numerous references in the agreement stating a 
given clause as "Subject to final Court approval of the 
Settlement," or the equivalent, see ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
11, 12, 14, J. App. at 57-66, also demonstrate how the parties 
intended to allocate rights and duties in the contract.  The 
"subject to" phrase was used largely to qualify TCO's duty to pay 
money, demonstrating that "final Court approval" was the linchpin 
of the contract for TCO because the heart of the exchange was 
extinguishing the class members' claims in exchange for money.  
                     
18
.  The class members also argue that TCO's recovery of unused 
money in substance excuses TCO's performance of payment, 
therefore making the contract executory under the definition in 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 872 
F.2d 36, 39 (1989).  We do not agree. 
  
The claims were extinguished upon final court approval and the 
parties made that event, not execution of the releases, key to 
the agreement. 
 The consequence of a class member's failure to execute 
a release supports this textual analysis.  A class member who 
failed to execute a release would not get its share of the 
settlement fund, but TCO would still get the benefit of the class 
member's inability to sustain a cause of action.  As the district 
court observed, "the parties seem to agree that if this case 
involved a simple exchange of money for execution of a release of 
all claims, there would be no question that the contract would 
not be executory."  In re Columbia Gas, 146 B.R. at 114.  Nor 
would any class member's failure absolve TCO from its duty to 
place the second $15 million into escrow, a duty which was to 
ripen on March 23, 1992, without regard to the actions of any 
class member.  No failure on the part of the class members to 
execute a release under the settlement agreement could have 
created a material breach of the contract.  Rather, the releases 
were a condition for each member to get its share of the 
settlement money.  
 2.  
 The settlement agreement also required each class 
member to complete a supplemental contract for future gas sales 
to TCO.  The question is whether that obligation is sufficient to 
constitute a "duty" as expressed in the Restatement section 225. 
 There is no indication that the supplemental contracts 
were designed to do more than take the terms of the global 
  
settlement agreement created by the class and TCO and apply them 
specifically to each class member.  As such they were 
functionally ministerial duties; they did not, nor were they 
supposed to, alter the relationship forged by the settlement 
agreement.  The terms of the supplemental contracts were 
expressly stated in the settlement agreement itself and were 
designed to be implemented with it.  This demonstrates the 
supplemental contracts were intended to confirm, not to create, 
the new purchasing arrangement between TCO and the class members. 
 We agree with the district court that "executing the 
contract supplements will be little more than a perfunctory act 
utilizing preapproved terms and conditions.  Obviously these 
ministerial acts are analogous to the execution of the release to 
be found in the settlement of any case."  In re Columbia Gas, 146 
B.R. at 114; see also Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard 
Farm Partnership), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
unperformed delivery of legal title to be a formality rather than 
"the kind of significant legal obligation that would render the 
contract executory"); In re GEC Indus., 107 B.R. 491, 492 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 1989) (holding seller's unperformed warranty obligations 
insufficient to make contract executory; buyer's administrative 
steps to submit claims for breach of warranty are merely 
procedural and do not make contract executory).  An individual 
class member's failure to execute the supplemental contract would 
not constitute a material breach of the settlement agreement but 
rather would be the failure of a condition that would relieve 
  
TCO's obligation to pay that member its portion of the escrow 
monies.19 
 Further, TCO cannot really be concerned with whether a 
given class member executes a supplemental contract, as the main 
terms governing the future purchases were embodied in the 
settlement agreement itself.  The supplemental contracts were 
more important to the class members (the obligors) than to TCO 
(the obligee).  Class counsel made clear before the district 
court that the supplemental contracts were important to the class 
members.  The supplemental contracts required TCO to pay higher 
                     
19
.  Although in a different context, we believe In re Sudbury, 
Inc., 153 B.R. 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993), is instructive.  The 
debtor claimed its insurance policies and related retrospective 
premium payments were not executory contracts.  Id. at 776.  The 
insurers argued the policies were executory and that the premium 
claims should get administrative expense priority.  Id. at 776-
77.  Bankruptcy did not relieve the insurers' obligation to 
provide coverage, and the payments the debtor owed did not alone 
make the policies executory.  Id. at 778.   
 
 The insurers argued the debtor had obligations to 
fulfill under cooperation clauses in the event it filed a claim.  
Id. at 779.  The court held these obligations were not enough to 
make the policies executory.  The court observed the debtor's 
failure to fulfill these obligations on a particular claim would 
only provide an insurer with a defense to that claim, but would 
not void the insurers' general obligations under the policies.  
Id.   The court also noted that the insurers' concern was gaining 
administrative expense priority, not having the debtor perform 
the cooperation clauses.  Id. at 780-81. 
 
 The supplemental contracts here are analogous to the 
obligations under the cooperation clauses.  The analogy is 
inexact but it illustrates the function of the supplemental 
contracts.  The debtor's failure to cooperate on a given claim, 
like a class member's failure to execute a supplemental contract, 
would relieve the other party (TCO/the insurers) from paying that 
one claim but not from the more general obligations embodied in 
the settlement agreement/insurance policies as a whole. 
  
prices than under the old contracts and thus benefitted the 
class, and the class even concedes the primary benefit of the 
contract supplements inured to the class members.  Without more, 
it was unlikely that the parties intended that failure to execute 
them would be a breach by the class members. 
 Although, as the class members point out, the 
supplements were also designed to prevent future disputes and as 
such they presumably benefit TCO, we are convinced that on 
balance the obligation to execute the supplemental contracts is 
not sufficient to make the settlement agreement executory.   Like 
the releases, the contract supplements were conditions to the 
class members' receipt of their portion of the settlement fund.  
Any class member's failure to execute the supplement would not 
constitute a breach of the settlement agreement.20 
                     
20
.  The facts here are readily distinguishable from those in 
Sharon Steel, in which we found an executory contract existed and 
observed: "The agreement is characterized by reciprocal 
obligations continuing into the future: National Fuel has 
promised to provide natural gas to Sharon, and Sharon has 
promised to purchase the gas at a certain price . . . ."  872 
F.2d at 39.  This met the bankruptcy definition of executory 
contract because either side's failure to perform would clearly 
have been a material breach.  Here, the class members' 
obligations were merely conditions.  TCO promised to pay an 
additional $15 million into the escrow account, and the class 
members' entitlement to those monies was contingent on completion 
of the releases and supplemental contracts.   
 
 The difference between the agreement in Sharon Steel 
and the agreement here illustrates the importance of the 
definition of executory contracts for purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Absent the limits imposed by Sharon Steel's definition of 
executory contract, the agreement here might appear executory.  
But the factual differences between this case and Sharon Steel 
point out that not every contract that appears executory because 
it has not been completely performed is executory for purposes of 
§ 365.  See Countryman, supra, at 450 ("All contracts to a 
  
 C. 
 An examination of the purpose of § 365 leads to the 
same result.  The only functional difference between assumption 
and rejection in this case, were the contract to be considered 
executory, is that assumption would give the class a higher 
priority to the unpaid $15 million.  In return TCO would gain 
nothing of value: the releases add no rights to the estate not 
already given by the district court's order, and the supplements 
provide only a marginal benefit to TCO.   The Ohio District 
Court's order bound the class as a whole.  Once the order became 
final and unappealable, all the class members were bound by it.  
Accordingly, the class members' failure to complete the tasks 
required for them to receive their money could not breach the 
agreement between the class and TCO, but could only serve as the 
failure of conditions precedent to their right to settlement 
monies.  Assumption would not add assets to the bankruptcy 
estate.  See In re Sudbury, Inc., 153 B.R. at 778-81 (holder 
unjustified in seeking first priority through executory contract 
provisions when pre-petition claim was not entitled to priority 
as administrative expense pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503).  The 
agreement is not an executory contract for purposes of § 365. 
 V. 
(..continued) 
greater or less extent are executory.  When they cease to be so, 
they cease to be contracts.  But that expansive meaning can 
hardly be given to the term as used in the Bankruptcy Act 
. . . ." (citation omitted)). 
  
 For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
  
 
